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Dear Members of the Massachusetts Community:
On behalf of the Race to the Top Coalition, I am pleased to share this progress report on the imple-
mentation of the Education Reform Act of 2010. The Coalition came together to advocate for reforms 
that will help to close achievement gaps in our state and will improve student outcomes for every 
graduate of the Massachusetts public school system.
The year 2010 was a remarkable one for education. In January, Governor Patrick signed historic 
legislation that put powerful new tools in the hands of school districts with struggling schools, and 
created new options for families, including new charter schools and in-district charters known as 
innovation schools.
Just a few months later, Massachusetts was the highest scoring state in the Obama Administration’s 
Race to the Top Competition, securing $250 million in new resources to support a redesign of our 
system, with particular emphasis on human capital, standards, assessments and school turnaround. 
Altogether, 276 districts signed onto the plan and began to rework the scaffolding of their system, 
including educator evaluation, data systems, curriculum and assessments.
As you will see in this report, the swift implementation of both the reform act and Race to the Top 
has yielded promising change. Thirty four schools were designated as turnaround schools, and with 
the help of new tools and resources, in just one year we have begun to increase student performance 
as measured by academic proficiency and growth rates. Sixteen new charters were awarded by 
the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, creating thousands more seats in schools 
with a track record of success. And, educators in 13 early adopter districts have opened innovation 
schools to test out new programs, models and structures—all designed to help students achieve.
But the work is far from done. Despite progress made in the 34 turnaround schools, the infrastruc-
ture is not yet in place to sustain these gains once the turnaround period is over. And there is a large 
cohort of schools that appeared to lose ground last year in English and math. Responding to that 
disappointing news may require turning around entire systems, which has never been done before.
The Race to the Top Coalition will continue its work as an outside advocate and critical friend until 
the promise of the reform law and the resources of Race to the Top have helped all children to fulfill 
their potential and graduate from Massachusetts high schools well positioned for success in post-
secondary pursuits.
Sincerely,
Paul S. Grogan
President and CEO
The Boston Foundation
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2010 was a watershed year for education reform in 
Massachusetts. In January, Governor Deval Patrick 
signed An Act Relative to the Achievement Gap into law. 
With the stroke of a pen, this sweeping reform legis-
lation ushered in a new generation of reform, and 
shifted the landscape of schooling in the Common-
wealth. The law provided educators with new “rules 
and tools,” including the power to intervene in turn-
around schools, to open new high performing charter 
schools in the lowest performing districts, and to inno-
vate through in-district charter schools. These reforms 
were designed to create a renewed sense of urgency 
around the need to close persistent achievement gaps 
by expanding proven strategies for reform. In addi-
tion, they were designed to position Massachusetts to 
qualify for federal Race to the Top stimulus funds.
A few months later, buoyed by this reform momen-
tum, Massachusetts submitted a proposal to the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Race to the Top competi-
tion. In doing so, the state proposed to pair the imme-
diate action agenda created through the legislation 
with a four part systems change strategy: ensure 
every student is taught by a great teacher and every 
school and district is led by a great leader; provide 
every educator with the curricular and instructional 
tools they need to promote student achievement; turn-
around the lowest performing schools; and prepare all 
students for success in college and career. 
A total of 276 school districts signed on in support 
of the application, representing 88% of the state’s 
students who live in poverty. On August 24, 2010, 
Massachusetts was awarded $250 million in Race to 
the Top funds, and was recognized as the highest scor-
ing state among the twelve winning states. Reviewers 
commended the application’s broad buy-in and the 
state’s track record of implementing bold reforms as 
contributors to the selection. 
Since then, Massachusetts has committed itself to a 
reform agenda designed to reinvent public schooling 
across the Commonwealth. The reform act created new 
parameters and a hybridized set of school structures, 
sending the message that there is no “one size fits 
all” model for effective schools. If implemented with 
fidelity, Race to the Top will, over four years, recreate 
the human capital pipeline by addressing teacher and 
administrator preparation, evaluation and professional 
development, and will redesign the standards and 
assessments so that all of Massachusetts’ high school 
graduates are prepared for college or career. In time, 
reforms launched through Race to the Top will be felt 
in every school across the Commonwealth and will be 
visible to the general public. 
At the moment, however, much of the reform has 
been embedded within the education community, and 
outside stakeholders have begun to wonder: What has 
changed? When will we see improvements in student 
performance, especially among our most vulnerable 
students? 
The good news is there has already been promising 
change to school structures and to student outcomes. 
While this work is incomplete, districts and schools 
across the state have developed and begun to imple-
ment turnaround plans for the state’s 34 lowest 
performing schools, and new school operators have 
opened charter schools in some of those same districts. 
The 2011 MCAS results show early promise in most of 
the turnaround schools, and confirm that replicating 
charter schools achieve impressive results with their 
students. In addition, an “innovation” movement has 
begun to take hold, with educators in 13 districts open-
ing 18 in-district “charter like” schools called innova-
tion schools that are designed to serve students better 
and unleash and expand the creative efforts inside of 
school districts.
There is much more to be done to fulfill the spirit 
of reform legislation and the Race to the Top. Level 
3 schools, which are one level above “turnaround 
schools,” have continued to struggle, with large 
numbers appearing to lose ground on the 2011 MCAS. 
In fact, 88 of the 269 Level 3 schools increased the 
percentage of students scoring “Warning/Failing” 
on the 2011 MCAS in both English Language Arts 
and math. No attempt has been made in this report to 
understand the cause of these troubling results; further 
I.
Introduction
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This report takes an in-depth look at the three primary 
strategies of the Achievement Gap Act: turnaround 
schools, charter schools and innovation schools, and 
asks three questions:
■■ What has happened since the passage of the reform 
act? 
■■ Are there early signs of progress or challenge?
■■ Does the implementation appear to be fulfilling the 
intent of the law: strategically connecting students 
with high performing schools and rapid school 
improvement, while unleashing innovation in 
school districts statewide?
■■ What have we learned from the last year and where 
are there opportunities to accelerate reform?
To answer those questions, first we considered the 
‘theory of change’ behind An Act Relative to the Achieve-
ment Gap. We then reviewed publicly available data, 
and interviewed key stakeholders, including staff from 
the Department of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion, district level staff, and a sampling of external 
partners, including union representatives.6 Information 
gathered from stakeholder interviews helped to shape 
the questions for additional consideration and recom-
mendations; no comments are individually attributed.
Passing legislation and winning the national Race to 
the Top (RTTT) contest will not be significant if our 
state fails to close the achievement gap and prepare 
all of our students for success in their post-secondary 
pursuits. The road ahead is likely to be challenging. 
Schools will need advocates and pressure to sustain 
the work. As a critical friend to the reform effort, the 
Race to the Top Coalition is committed to keeping 
the data in the public eye and developing reports and 
tools that focus on the pace and progress of reform. By 
doing so, we hope to sustain political will and public 
support for reform. 
This is the first review of the dramatic reforms that 
have taken place over the last year. The goal is to set 
a baseline against which improvements and system 
redesign can be assessed. 
A review of Race to the Top implementation will 
follow this publication, which will attempt to describe 
the building blocks of reform that have been launched 
since winning RTTT funds, and will seek to create tools 
to help stakeholders understand and track the progress 
of Race to the Top in Massachusetts. We will select 
analysis will be needed. However, as the state prepares 
to identify another round of turnaround schools, some 
of these schools will undoubtedly be placed into Level 
4 and charged with the development of a turnaround 
plan.1 (More than half, 51%, of the Level 3 schools are 
located in the nine districts where the current turn-
around schools are, raising capacity questions about 
the ability of the districts to support their turnaround.)
And, across the state, achievement gaps persist. New 
data from the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress, which acts as the “nation’s report card,” 
confirmed that while Massachusetts 4th and 8th graders 
outscored their peers in every other state for the fourth 
consecutive year, there continue to be significant 
achievement gaps between white students and African 
American and Hispanic students, and between low-
income and non-low-income students.2 While there 
has been progress toward closing those gaps over the 
last 19 years, the pace of that progress is slow. Gaps 
between white and African American and Hispanic 
students average 27.5 percentage points on the reading 
and math assessments in grades 4 and 8.3 Low-income 
students lag behind their non-low-income peers by an 
average of 26.25 percentage points.4 None of these gaps 
have narrowed significantly since the last administra-
tion of NAEP, in 2009.
Achievement gaps are apparent in MCAS scores and 
in high school and college graduation rates. They can 
also be seen in Advanced Placement participation and 
performance rates. According to the College Board, 
in 2010, 33.2% of seniors in Massachusetts left high 
school having taken at least one Advanced Placement 
exam in their senior year (23.1% scoring a passing 
grade or higher). Yet, only 2.4% of African American 
students left high school having scored a passing grade 
on an AP exam. For Latino students, the numbers are 
slightly better: 4.9% scored a passing grade. For white 
students, 75.6% scored a 3 or better.5
In terms of excellence and academic rigor, Advanced 
Placement participation and performance are some 
of the most commonly recognized indicators, and are 
often used as a proxy for college readiness.
Closing these achievement gaps will be critically 
important if Massachusetts is to prepare all of its 
students for post-secondary success. 
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key intermediate metrics and long-term outcomes that 
point to broad changes in student performance. Poten-
tial metrics to track include:
■■ 75% of the state’s lowest performing schools turning 
around by 2014;
■■ 85% of high school graduates across the state 
completing a college-ready curriculum by 2014;
■■ closing racial, ethnic, and income-based achieve-
ment gaps by 2014;
■■ district and state implementation of key reforms to 
drive and sustain long-term systems change.
Further analysis will be required to establish whether 
the pace of the Massachusetts reform agenda is leading 
or even keeping pace with other states. 
Ultimately, the success of these systems change efforts 
will be measured by our students’ success in the 
Commonwealth’s knowledge economy. The stakes are 
high for students, and the time to prepare them is now.
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II.
Summary & Recommendations
Charter Schools
Summary: In one year, the state has identified high 
performing “proven providers” and has approved a 
dramatic expansion of charters, especially in Boston. 
There is continued need to connect high performing 
charters to students in the Gateway Cities. The repli-
cation in Boston fulfills the spirit of the legislation 
by replicating in one of the neediest districts, but the 
promise of attracting proven providers to operate high 
performing charters in other low-performing urban 
districts has not yet been fulfilled. 
Recommendations:
 1. Create incentives for proven providers to open 
charters in cities with excess room under their 
charter caps (including Springfield and Worcester), 
and support the development of a human capital 
pipeline of prospective charter leaders.
 2. Identify strategies to connect charters to unused 
school facilities.
 3. Review the statutory language related to Horace 
Mann Charters and ease barriers to start up and 
amendments to and renewal of charters. Consider 
strategies to provide incentives for the creation of 
new Horace Mann Charters.
 4. Review state capacity to support a rigorous appli-
cation and accountability process for charter 
schools.
Innovation Schools
Summary: 18 schools have opened as innovation 
schools, and another has recently been approved 
in 13 districts. The Innovation Plans focus on serv-
ing specific populations of students, implementing 
new programming, and altering structures for teach-
ers. While most of the schools have been initiated by 
district level leaders, it appears the Achievement Gap 
Act’s goal of sparking innovation within districts is 
gaining traction. 
Turnaround Schools
Summary: Early progress can be observed in the Level 
4 schools, especially as measured by student growth. 
Concerns persist about state and district capacity to 
meet turnaround goals and prevent Level 3 schools 
from becoming Level 4. 
Recommendations:
 1. Build or recruit internal and external capacity 
to support and sustain the turnaround work in 
districts, especially for those districts with large 
numbers of turnaround schools.
 2. Build long-term capacity in school districts for 
turnaround schools by addressing today’s chal-
lenges, including human resources and staffing 
turnarounds and forming partnerships with lead 
and supporting turnaround partners. Ensure that 
external partners are skilled in turning schools 
around, have a track record of doing so and are 
accountable to school districts for improving 
student performance in schools. 
 3. Work with districts and partners to deepen strat-
egies to address conditions in Level 3 schools, 
before they fall to Level 4.
 4. Work with districts to develop plans for “post-
turnaround.” Consider creating incentives for 
turnaround schools to become innovation schools 
so that they can preserve their autonomies and 
sustain their improved performance. Explore costs 
associated with models for sustaining improve-
ment and turnaround.
 5. Commission and publicize research about what 
is working, including the impact of autonomies, 
extra time and effective partners.
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Recommendations:
 1. Support ongoing growth by brokering partner-
ships with innovation schools.
 2. Urge turnaround schools to consider innovation 
school status as a long-term strategy for sustaining 
the turnaround.
 3. Provide support to large districts with significant 
interest in the model.
 4. Continue providing planning and implementation 
support.
 5. Continue efforts to publicize the model.
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III.
About the Achievement Gap Act
Implementation Highlights: 34 Level 4 schools in nine 
districts. Thirty-five of the lowest performing schools 
in nine districts were identified as Level 4 (or turn-
around schools), resulting in changes in the staffing, 
partners, school day and budgets of each school.7 
These turnaround schools and their districts enroll a 
much higher concentration of low-income students 
than the state average: 87% among the schools and 
78% among the districts compared to the statewide 
average of 34%. Turnaround schools also enroll higher 
percentages of Limited English Proficient students, 
29%, compared to 22% in the nine districts in which 
the turnarounds are located and 7% statewide.
Turnaround schools received new resources from Title 
I and Race to the Top. They also hired new staff from 
inside and outside the school district, lengthened their 
school day for students and teachers, brought in new 
partners and programs, and focused in a laser like way 
on student performance data. As a result, many of 
these schools already are beginning to show progress 
on the state’s MCAS exams. 
Charter Schools
The best charter schools in Massachusetts have demon-
strated that low-income students and students of color 
can achieve at the highest levels. However, because of 
charter caps, these public schools still serve only a frac-
tion of the students who need them. The Act sought 
to connect these high performing schools with the 
neediest students by expanding the number of seats 
available in the lowest performing schools districts and 
by holding charters accountable for serving the most 
vulnerable subgroups of students.
Implementation Highlights: 16 new Commonwealth 
and Horace Mann Charters. In February 2011, the 
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education 
awarded a historic 16 new charters, which repre-
sented the highest number of charters ever granted in 
a single year and means that over the next few years, 
thousands of additional students in the state’s lowest 
performing districts will have access to charter public 
Theory of Change &  
Implementation Highlights
An Act Relative to the Achievement Gap sought to rapidly 
improve student performance across the state, by stra-
tegically addressing the greatest needs in our public 
education system: closing persistent achievement 
gaps that can be seen in nearly every district. The law 
created new “rules and tools” as well as new school, 
district and state-level responsibilities for improving 
the Commonwealth’s lowest performing schools. 
The Act also sought to create a 21st century system of 
public schools that would give families and students 
across the state multiple options for excellent public 
schools inside and outside school districts. Drawing 
on core principles of autonomy and flexibility, the Act 
expanded seats in high performing charter schools and 
created a new type of in-district charter, innovation 
schools. 
The new system, articulated in the Act will ultimately 
require a different kind of partnership between 
schools, districts, and the state’s Department of 
Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE). In 
particular, the DESE will need to transform itself into 
an agency that is able to provide guidance and differ-
entiated supports, as well as rigorous accountability. 
Turnaround Schools
The Act sought to dramatically and quickly improve 
student performance in the lowest performing schools 
by giving Superintendents: new tools to intervene 
quickly and change policies and practices within the 
underperforming school; new authority to require staff 
to reapply for their positions in turnaround schools, 
including the ability to limit, suspend, or change provi-
sions within the teachers’ contract (as they apply to the 
school); and a new expedited process for bargaining 
work rules in the turnaround schools with local teach-
ers unions. 
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Interventions, Innovations  
and Improvements
The Act Relative to the Achievement Gap in Massachusetts 
can be organized into three broad categories: interven-
tions, innovations and improvements. 
Interventions
■■ Authorizes the Commissioner of Elementary and 
Secondary Education to designate up to 72 schools, 
or no more than 4% of all schools, as either “under-
performing” (Level 4) or “chronically underper-
forming” (Level 5) based on student achievement 
and improvement measures. 
■■ These schools may be selected from a pool of the 
lowest 20% performing schools.
■■ Student achievement and improvement measures 
will be determined largely by MCAS scores. 
■■ Enables the Commissioner to designate no more 
than 2.5% of all districts as “chronically underper-
forming” districts. Districts may be selected from 
the lowest 10% of districts.
■■ Targets schools and districts for aggressive inter-
vention through a turnaround plan developed in 
collaboration with the superintendent, the school 
committee, the local teachers’ union, administra-
tors, teachers, community representatives and, most 
importantly, parents. The plan is expeditiously 
implemented by the district superintendents and 
the Commissioner.
■■ Intervention powers include the ability to more 
expeditiously dismiss or replace poor performing 
teachers and administrators, as well as the authori-
zation to reopen and amend collective bargaining 
agreements in order to drive rapid improvement. 
■■ In both Level 4 and Level 5 schools, teachers may 
be dismissed for “good cause” with the right to 
arbitration. 
■■ In Level 4 schools, collective bargaining agree-
ments may be reopened without arbitration, but 
with the option of a dispute resolution process 
featuring a panel of three members, including 
one representative each from labor and manage-
ment, and a third from the American Arbitration 
schools, providing families with a high quality option 
for their children. Thirteen of those charters were 
Commonwealth Charters, which will create more than 
6,500 new seats in charter schools in Boston, Chelsea, 
Holyoke, Springfield, Lawrence and New Bedford 
over the next few years. Three Horace Mann charters 
were granted; those in-district charters will enroll 1,200 
students. 
Innovation Schools
The law created a new type of in-district charter 
school that operates with autonomy and flexibility in 
key areas: curriculum, budget, school schedule and 
calendar, staffing, professional development, and 
school district policies. The innovation school model 
acknowledges that in every district there are successful 
educators and schools. With access to this new model, 
educators will be able to serve students better and 
implement new strategies, which will maximize gains 
in student learning. Innovation schools can be a vehicle 
to accelerate growth in every district. This tool —unlike 
the turnaround model or the smart cap lift on char-
ters—can be used by a broad range of districts.
Implementation Highlights: 18 operating (and 19 approved) 
innovation schools. Thirteen districts have authorized 
innovation schools, providing teachers in Revere, 
Boston, Worcester, Springfield and Cape Cod with 
tools historically available only to charter operators to 
reimagine and redesign their schools. In some of these 
communities, central office staff has begun to identify 
district level systems changes that can support and 
grow a portfolio of innovative schools and schools 
with autonomies.
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Association, all of whom shall have an education 
background, with unresolved issues to be settled 
by the Commissioner.
■■ In Level 5 schools, the Commissioner shall 
resolve any disputes.
■■ In underperforming district intervention, the 
Commissioner may elect to trigger dispute reso-
lution in which case the three person panel either 
must act unanimously or any disputes will be 
settled by the Commissioner. 
■■ Allows for expedited turnaround plans for schools 
that have been previously designated as underper-
forming and where the district has a turnaround 
plan that has had a public comment period and 
approval of the local school committee. Only Boston 
qualified under this language to do things more 
quickly than other districts.
Innovations
■■ Allows up to 14 new Horace Mann schools to be 
established under a new process that removes the 
requirement of union approval, a current barrier 
to growth. This type of in-district public school, 
approved by the local school committee and super-
intendent, provides additional local control over 
innovative educational programs and the ability to 
retain educational dollars within the community. 
The City of Boston is allowed to establish no fewer 
than four of these schools.
■■ Establishes new innovation schools, which are 
in-district public schools with increased autonomy 
and flexibility to operate. These unique schools, 
through collaboration with teachers and parents, 
will promote high levels of student achieve-
ment through an innovation plan and represent 
an in-district alternative to other types of charter 
schools.
Improvements
■■ Raises the state spending cap for charter schools 
from 9% to 18% of new school spending in the 
lowest 10 percent performing districts. 
■■ Also streamlines current charter school caps by 
eliminating the cap that limits the state’s total 
charter school population to 4%. Preserves current 
caps of no more than 72 Commonwealth Charter 
Schools and no more than 48 Horace Mann Charter 
Schools.
■■ Establishes new requirements on charter schools 
to develop recruitment and retention plans, “back-
fill” student vacancies in half of the highest grades 
(rounding down and not beyond the ninth grade), 
and provide greater transparency and accountabil-
ity in the approval process.
■■ Maintains charter tuition and facilities funding 
formulas, and stipulates that in FY11 and thereafter, 
reimbursements shall not be less than the FY10 per 
pupil amount.
■■ Increases and extends reimbursement to school 
districts affected by charter school growth (from 
100/60/40 percent reimbursement over three 
years to 100/25/25/25/25/25 over six years). This 
reimbursement reform will allow for a greater 
recognition of the fixed educational costs districts 
face.
■■ Requires charter operators to be “proven providers” 
if they open in the lowest performing districts (and 
the cap is at least at 9%).
■■ Enables municipalities to sell excess properties to 
charter schools. 
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IV.
Turnaround Schools
Theory of Change:
Dramatically improve performance in the lowest performing schools, and address achievement 
gaps head-on by giving the state and districts expedited intervention authority. The state will 
identify turnaround schools and will transform itself into an agency that provides guidance, 
differentiated supports and accountability. Establish a finite timeline within which schools 
need to make improvements. The new flexibilities, paired with new funds for school turn-
around, will help schools improve. Through Race to the Top, the state will build supports for 
and capacity in districts to support school turnaround.
Funding: Funding from the Federal Government’s Title I School Improvement Grants (1003a and 1003g) and funds from Race to the Top will support the turnaround in the lowest performing schools.
Progress:
Early progress can be observed in the Level 4 schools, especially as measured by student 
growth. Yet concerns persist about state and district capacity to meet turnaround goals and 
prevent Level 3 schools from becoming Level 4.
Fidelity of 
Implementation:
Level 4 schools enroll large numbers of low-income, Latino, and African American students. 
Focusing on these schools begins to fulfill the law’s intent of targeting the most persistent 
achievement gaps. 
Thirty-five schools were identified as Level 4; one school has closed. The 34 Level 4 schools 
each adopted one of 4 models of school turnaround. The schools addressed staffing flexibility 
differently, some requiring teachers to reapply for their positions, others did not. All have 
extended the school day, including some combination of increased instructional and profes-
sional development time.  
Summary:
Nearly all of the Level 4 schools made strides on the 2011 MCAS in either English Language 
Arts or Math, or both, with nearly every school increasing proficiency rates. Leaders in districts 
with Level 4 schools identified the longer day and the staffing flexibilities as key contributors 
to implementing the turnaround plan. Further analysis is needed to determine what’s working, 
what’s not, and in particular how the schools’ new autonomies contributed to these gains. 
As the state prepares to identify another cohort of Level 4 schools, districts will face capacity 
and human capital challenges. The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education is 
rethinking its strategy of an external intermediary to support turnaround and should identify 
a new support strategy to develop internal district capacity and new external partners who can 
support them as quickly as possible.
Recommendations:
 1. Build or recruit internal and external capacity to support and sustain the turnaround work 
in districts, especially for those districts with large numbers of turnaround schools.
 2. Build long-term capacity in school districts for turnaround schools by addressing today’s 
challenges, including human resources, staffing turnarounds and forming partnerships with 
lead and supporting turnaround partners. Ensure that external partners are skilled in turn-
ing schools around, have a track record of doing so and are accountable to school districts 
for improving student performance in schools. 
 3. Work with districts and partners to deepen strategies to address conditions in Level 3 
schools, before they fall to Level 4.
 4. Work with districts to develop plans for “post-turnaround.” Consider creating incentives 
for turnaround schools to become innovation schools so that they can preserve their autono-
mies and sustain their improved performance. Explore costs associated with models for 
sustaining improvement and turnaround. Commission and publicize research about what’s 
working, including the impact of autonomies, extra time and effective partners.
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“chronically underperforming.” Level 5 schools may 
be put into state receivership. Massachusetts does not 
currently have any schools identified as Level 5. 
If a school exits Level 4 status and moves up to 
become a Level 3 school, the negotiated provisions 
of the turnaround plan can be extended at the 
Commissioner’s discretion. According to the 
Accountability and Assistance Regulations for Schools 
and Districts, The superintendent may propose to continue 
and the commissioner may allow to continue more than 
one such feature of the turnaround plan. Under the 
Regulations, two years after the school’s removal from 
Level 4, the commissioner shall conduct a review to 
determine whether to continue the provisions.8
This turnaround agenda was a foundational compo-
nent of the state’s Race to the Top plan. As part of 
RTTT, the state committed to turning around 75% of 
the lowest performing schools within three years. 
Through the School Redesign Grant program (part of 
the federal Title I grant program) districts are eligible 
to apply for turnaround funds on behalf of each of its 
Level 4 schools. The first cohort of schools to receive 
funding included 12 schools in three districts which 
received a total of $27,510,901 (paid out over 3 years). 
The second cohort of funded schools included 18 
schools in eight districts which received $24,798,188.9 
In total the state’s lowest performing schools have 
received $52,309,089.
Schools receiving this funding were required to choose 
one of four intervention models and must demonstrate 
their capacity to implement that model effectively over 
three years. The models have different requirements 
for the percentage of the staff that may retain their 
positions. Districts home to nine or more turnaround 
schools (Boston and Springfield) were required to use 
the “turnaround” or “restart” model in at least half of 
the schools, which meant that in those buildings, no 
more than 50% of the original staff could return to the 
turnaround school—or school management would 
have to be handed over to a charter management orga-
nization or education management organization.
At the national level, reformers are watching turn-
around efforts and results closely. Some have begun 
to question what happens if the 12 RTTT states don’t 
show improvement in student achievement as early 
as 2012. In Massachusetts, one year’s worth of data 
Key Provisions
Turning around the lowest performing schools is a 
central tenet of both An Act Relative to the Achievement 
Gap and the Massachusetts Race to the Top proposal. 
Both recognize the urgent need to improve outcomes 
for students who attend these schools.
The education reform law signed in 2010 created a 
new framework for school turnaround, granting new 
powers to superintendents and creating a sense of 
urgency around the need for dramatic improvement. 
As part of the law, the Commissioner of Elementary 
and Secondary Education is authorized to designate 
one or more schools in a school district as “underper-
forming” (Level 4) or “chronically underperforming” 
(Level 5). Multiple indicators of school quality must 
inform the underperforming or chronically underper-
forming designation, including student performance 
data, school or district review indicators and other 
factors outlined in regulations adopted by the Board  
of Elementary and Secondary Education. 
Once a school is designated as Level 4, the law gives 
superintendents the ability to reassign or replace teach-
ers and administrators in those schools and dismiss 
those with a track record of poor performance, as well 
as authority to reopen and renegotiate (on an expe-
dited timeline) collective bargaining agreements as 
they pertain to the school. The new law lowered the 
standard for dismissal of teachers with professional 
teaching status (more commonly referred to as tenure) 
from “just cause” to “good cause.” 
The legislation reset the clock on turnaround efforts. 
The state had been engaged with districts on school 
turnaround previously, and schools already in turn-
around restarted their turnaround timeline, to be 
on the same three-year trajectory as the new Level 4 
schools.
Turnaround schools have three years to improve their 
students’ growth and performance, through a turn-
around plan that is developed in collaboration with the 
superintendent, the school committee, the local teach-
ers’ union, administrators, teachers and community 
stakeholders, including parents. The turnaround plan 
sets the working conditions for the school during its 
turnaround (Level 4) designation. If, after three years, 
these schools have not met the improvement goals set 
for them by the DESE, the schools could be declared 
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■■ Low Income: Turnaround schools and their districts 
enroll a much higher concentration of low-income 
students than the state average: 87% among the 
schools and 78% among the districts compared to 
the statewide average of 34%.
■■ Race/Ethnicity: The 34 turnaround schools and 
their districts disproportionately enroll Massachu-
setts’ Latino students: 56.5% of students enrolled 
in turnaround schools and 53% of students in the 
districts are Latino compared to the 15% statewide 
average Latino enrollment. 
■■ Turnaround schools enroll African American 
students at twice the concentration of their district 
average: 24% of students enrolled in turnaround 
schools are African American compared to a 12% 
average enrollment among their districts. Statewide, 
8% of students are African American. 
■■ Turnaround schools enroll a smaller percentage of 
Asian students than the district’s average and the 
state: on average, 5% of turnaround students are 
Asian compared to 7.5% across the nine districts. 
Statewide, 5.5% of students are Asian. 
from turnaround schools and early indications from 
in-district charter and innovation schools are already 
demonstrating promising results.
Turnaround Schools: By the Numbers
■■ January 2010: An Act Relative to the Achievement Gap 
gives new authority to superintendents to intervene 
in low performing schools.
■■ March 2010: The Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education identifies 35 schools as “Level 
4” schools, located in nine urban districts.10 These 
schools enroll a higher concentration of low- income 
students, and the schools and their districts dispro-
portionately enroll Massachusetts’ Latino students. 
Furthermore, these schools enroll twice the number 
of African American students as the other schools in 
their district.
■■ A total of 269 schools were identified as Level 3 
schools; 139 of these schools are in the same nine 
districts as the 35 Level 4 schools.
■■ In April 2010, the BESE adopts new regulations for 
turnaround schools.
■■ In September 2010, the DESE awards the first round 
of School Redesign Grants to support the turn-
around process. A total of 12 schools from three 
districts received grants. In March 2011, a second 
cohort of schools receive SRG grants; 18 schools in 
eight districts receive funds. The schools include 
Level 4 schools and low performing Level 3 schools.
Context: who are the students in  
turnaround schools?
■■ First Language Not English or Limited English 
Proficient Students: 46% of students at turn-
around schools and 49% of students within the nine 
districts are English Language Learners compared 
to 16% statewide. At the turnaround schools, a 
larger percent of these students are Limited English 
Proficient, 29%, compared to 22% among the nine 
districts and 7% statewide.
■■ Students with Disabilities: Turnaround schools and 
their districts enroll a slightly higher percentage of 
Students with Disabilities than the statewide average: 
20% and 19.5% compared to 17% statewide.
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■■ Increase in Composite Performance Index
■■ Progress toward target—measured by Student 
Growth Percentile
Staff of the Boston Indicators Project analyzed student 
performance data from the Massachusetts Department 
of Elementary and Secondary Education and produced 
a detailed analysis of school-by-school performance 
and growth.11
Some of the performance gains include:
■■ Three (or almost 9%) of the Level 4 schools are 
making gains in student performance, meaning 
that they reduced the number of students scor-
ing warning or failing on the MCAS, increased the 
number of students scoring proficient or advanced 
and (perhaps most significantly) their students 
progressed faster than 60% of like students across 
the state.
■■ Seven schools (almost 21%) reduced the number of 
students scoring warning or failing on the MCAS, 
increased the number of students scoring proficient 
or advanced, and had students who demonstrated 
about as much growth as like students statewide.
■■ Three schools reduced the number of students 
scoring warning or failing on the MCAS, and 
increased the number of students scoring proficient 
or advanced but showed less growth than like 
students statewide.
■■ Four schools showed progress in either ELA or 
math and demonstrated comparable growth.
■■ Only three schools appeared to be stalled, meaning 
they did not make progress in any of the key indica-
tors of turnaround.12
Highlights of the 2011 MCAS data are on page 17. 
These results appear to suggest that the Level 4 schools 
are on a growth and improvement trajectory. Most 
of the charter schools had roughly the same rate of 
growth when compared to their academic peers state-
wide. (Student growth in the 40–60% range is consid-
ered average.) But importantly, turnarounds appear 
to be focused on increasing the percentage of their 
students who score Proficient or Advanced on the 
MCAS. 
Additional analysis will be required to better under-
stand the causes of these results.
■■ The average enrollment of white students in 
turnaround schools is less than half the district’s 
average enrollment: on average, 12% of students in 
turnaround schools are white compared to 25% of 
their districts average. Statewide, 68% of students 
are white.
Noteworthy Accomplishments
The results of the 2011 MCAS suggest that students 
in turnaround schools are beginning to demonstrate 
improved outcomes. Anecdotally, superintendents 
and principals attribute this to a new school culture, 
heightened focus on student data and (in some cases) 
a handpicked team of experienced and new faculty 
members. 
Nonetheless, schools cannot be expected to fully “turn-
around” in only one year. The pace of improvement, as 
well as the number of students scoring proficient and 
advanced, are part of the story of improvement. For 
that reason, our analysis of turnaround performance is 
based on three key indicators of turnaround success:
■■ Decrease in the percent of students who score 
warning/failing
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This chart shows both growth and a change in Proficiency and Advanced in English Language Arts. Growth in 
the 40%-60% range is considered average growth.
Highlights from the 2011 English Language Arts MCAS
■■ Twenty-three turnaround schools increased their rates of students scoring Proficient or above in English 
Language Arts. 
■■ Four turnaround schools demonstrated “high growth” in English Language Arts: Orchard Gardens in Boston, 
John J. Doran School in Fall River, E.J. Harrington in Lynn, and the Alfred G. Zanetti school in Springfield. This 
means their student growth rate was better than 60% of their academic peers statewide. Most turnarounds fall 
into the 40–60% growth percentile, which means the student growth was about the same as their academic 
peers around the state.
Highlights from the 2011 Math MCAS
■■ Twenty-five turnaround schools increased their rates of students scoring Proficient or above in Math. 
■■ Twelve turnaround schools demonstrated “high growth” in Math, which means their students’ growth was 
better than 60% of their academic peers statewide.
■■ Eleven turnaround schools demonstrated high growth and increased rates of Proficiency.
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Superintendents indicated that the tools were “the 
right ones,” “were very helpful,” and “really provided 
the leverage needed to start the change process.” 
Districts reported that the tools provided allowed them 
to extend time (learning time and professional devel-
opment time for teachers), form professional collabora-
tion teams, create incentives for individuals and teams, 
and grant principals decision-making authority over 
schedules and school policies. 
Bargaining Agreements
In particular, Superintendents identified the abil-
ity to reopen collective bargaining as critical to the 
work. “Having the authority to request that the school 
committee and any union can bargain or reopen a 
collective bargaining agreement in order to alter the 
Superintendent Reflections on  
Year One of Turnaround:
In September and October of 2011, Superintendents 
who lead districts with at least one Level 4 school were 
invited to participate in either an interview or a survey 
designed to capture their experience with the first 
year of turning around one or more schools. All nine 
districts that are home to Level 4 schools participated, 
and responses were collected from either the Superin-
tendent or his/her senior level designee.13 The survey 
questions can be found in the sidebar on page 25.
In general, Superintendents had positive comments 
about the new intervention tools provided by the 
legislation, and the initial signs of progress in the 
34 turnaround schools. Nearly all of the surveyed 
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In most cases, as required by federal turnaround 
requirements, the principals were replaced, and in 
most of the districts with a small number of turn-
arounds, principals were hired from within the district. 
Two districts with large numbers of turnarounds noted 
that they recruited principals from outside the system. 
Several districts noted that replacing the principal 
was a “difficult but necessary step.” When asked to 
describe what they were looking for in a principal, 
Superintendents described “experienced leaders,” 
“someone who knows academics,” “someone who  
can be a change agent.” 
Not every principal appointment was successful, 
and at least one district has already seen changes in 
the leadership of turnaround schools. “We selected 
a great team of experienced turnaround leaders but 
there were changes during year one. We are confident 
that the replacements selected will be effective. The 
district worked with parents and staff in the affected 
schools to select and introduce new school leaders 
midyear. This helped transform what might have been 
an obstacle into an opportunity for collaborative school 
improvement.”
Districts expressed confidence in the leadership abili-
ties of the turnaround leaders, though several noted 
that the district itself needed to “develop internal 
capacity to train our current leaders to meet the 
demands of turning around persistent low-performing 
schools.” Several felt the expertise existed within the 
district, though many noted that the current work-
force—in schools and in the central office— is not 
trained for turnaround work. One district said: “It is 
difficult to imagine that we can develop the capacity  
in the short time required for turnaround.” 
Whether teachers were asked to reapply for their posi-
tions was treated differently across districts. In the 
majority of surveyed districts, the district reported that 
most of the teachers with professional teaching status 
(more commonly referred to as tenure) found place-
ments elsewhere in the district.14 A July 5 Boston Globe 
story on turnaround teachers in Boston suggests this 
may not have been the case in Boston, with a number 
of teachers leaving the district. Further analysis is 
warranted to determine the percentage of teachers with 
professional teaching status who did not return to each 
district.
compensation, hours and working conditions of the 
administrators, teachers, principal and staff at any 
underperforming school” was noted as being particu-
larly helpful. As another district noted: “The most 
important part of the legislation was the conciliation 
process that led to the flexibilities necessary to accel-
erate the reform work. The Level 4 reform work was 
dramatically enabled through this process.”
Another district noted that the Superintendent’s 
authority to request that the school committee and 
any union can bargain or reopen a collective bargain-
ing agreement resulted in a new agreement around 
compensation, hours and working conditions of the 
administrators, teachers, principal and staff in the 
underperforming schools. 
Related to that, having to bargain changes to collective 
bargaining agreements based on the Joint Resolution 
Committee Agreement was cited as a key contributor 
to securing these agreements. 
One district summed up the general reaction to these 
authorities: they “facilitated the lengthening of the 
school day, increased time for professional devel-
opment and teacher collaboration, established the 
instructional leader position, increased principal 
authority to establish the workday or work year, and 
provided hiring and staffing flexibility. However, 
each of these elements had to be bargained, resulting 
in approximately half of our school redesign dollars 
being dedicated for more time and in some cases more 
than half of these funds needing to be used to support 
additional time.” 
One Superintendent noted that the legislation’s focus 
on Level 4 schools may have represented a missed 
opportunity to intervene in Level 3 schools and 
prevent them from becoming Level 4. “Why do we 
need to wait for a school to be in trouble before acting? 
The law is good on intervention, but less so  
on prevention.”
Human Capital
All of the Superintendents identified human capital 
as core to their strategy and a challenge in the Level 4 
schools. Having the discretion to require that the prin-
cipal and all administrators, teachers and staff reapply 
for their positions in the school, following consultation 
with applicable local unions, was cited as very helpful.
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Nonetheless, the flexibility to hire and add additional 
staff was cited in nearly every interview. Putting 
together the right team has resulted in schools in 
which “everyone is incredibly focused on what kids 
need.” Noted another Superintendent: “It wasn’t that 
the teachers in the turnaround school were all bad. But 
the culture in the building needed to change.” 
One Superintendent reported that the staffing auton-
omy means that teachers in Level 4 schools “cannot be 
‘bumped’ out of their positions. This has stabilized the 
staff at our turnaround schools. This means the staff is 
now able to pick up in September where they left off in 
June with minimal changes to the team.” 
Unrealistic Timelines
Despite the mostly positive comments on the turn-
around process, nearly all of the Superintendents 
noted that the timeline for developing and implement-
ing turnaround plans—as well as the magnitude of 
change, including the new teacher evaluation system—
was overwhelming. Nearly every district noted that 
it was difficult to meet key deadlines given the very 
short timeline between schools being designated as 
turnaround and the start of the new school year. 
One noted: “It’s been like drinking from a fire hose.” 
Another said, “We’re building the plane as we’re 
flying it.” Nonetheless, a third district acknowledged: 
“the timelines that were outlined to complete impor-
tant steps in the turnaround process seemed short 
and unreasonable at the time. Having completed the 
process I understand that we would not be where we 
are in the implementation stage if we did not have 
these timelines.” 
In response to the aggressive timelines, there was not 
unanimity on the part of the Superintendents about 
whether the tools equipped them to make changes 
quickly enough. One Superintendent noted: “Our 
conversations with the union returned often to the 
spirit of the legislation: whatever reforms we were 
discussing needed to be guided by what’s in the best 
interest for students.” Another noted that by requiring 
districts to negotiate with the union, the process was 
slower than it needed to be, given the aggressive time-
line for turnaround. At least one district commented 
that the process would be more efficient without the 
need to bargain new agreements.
Districts with more than one or two Level 4 schools 
noted that while the principals of those schools 
enjoyed greater flexibility in hiring than their non-level 
four counterparts, it was a challenge to fill the large 
numbers of teaching vacancies that were created by the 
turnaround, and to move large numbers of teachers 
into other buildings. One principal noted that he had 
been able to fill his vacancies, because he started early 
and was able to identify specific teachers to recruit, or 
networks to tap into. But “what happens when those 
teachers start to leave? When I think about sustain-
ing the turnaround, where does my pipeline of good 
teachers come from?” Also, districts noted the need to 
recruit experienced math and science teachers.
Depending on the turnaround model used, schools 
retained between 10% and 85% of their instructional 
staff over the first two years of turnaround, with an 
average staff retention rate of 55%. One district noted: 
“The principals hired teachers who shared their vision 
for dramatically improving student achievement. The 
teachers that replaced the excessed teachers under-
stood the urgency in these schools, believed that 
students can and should be successful and wanted to 
be part of the transformation.”
Another referenced the changed culture among the 
veteran teachers, reporting “we used to think we had 
to look out the window; now we know [that] we need 
to look in the mirror” when seeking both the chal-
lenges and the solutions related to improving student 
learning.
Superintendents agreed that it may be too early to 
say how staffing changes are contributing to the turn-
around process, noting that the number of interven-
tions put in place at each Level 4 school are numerous 
and address each of the conditions for effective schools 
identified by DESE and in the district’s own redesign 
plan (such as effective leadership, cultures of teacher 
collaboration, student assessment, social-emotional 
support for students, tiered instruction, family and 
community engagement, etc.). Superintendents felt 
more confident in stating that over a nine-month 
period there is evidence that most of the school rede-
sign plans have been implemented with some success. 
More qualitative research across turnaround schools 
will help to identify the school and classroom prac-
tices, as well as partnerships, that are most effective 
across all the Level 4 schools. 
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“working hard to get information to us as early as 
possible.” 
Another Superintendent noted: “The state is working 
to determine how best to balance the partnership and 
collaboration role with their compliance and monitor-
ing responsibilities.” The Level 4 Network appears 
to be widely viewed as an important network of 
resources and support. In addition, the state’s list of 
“Essential Conditions” for turnaround was referenced 
as being an important contributor to the gains made by 
turnaround schools. 
One district noted that the DESE is working to develop 
cross-functional work within the agency. Of particular 
urgency, noted this leader, was the need to connect 
oversight and management of turnaround efforts 
with the work to implement Common Core, the 
pre-AP training for teachers and the Massachusetts 
Model for School Counseling. Building a new culture 
within the DESE is one of the goals of the state’s RTTT 
application. 
Turnaround Plans 
A review of the agreements for turnarounds revealed 
that they included the following common elements: 
■■ A longer school day: Districts added between 30–90 
minutes to the school day, and that time was used 
to implement the turnaround plan through either 
student contact time or through additional planning 
and professional development time. In some cases, 
this additional time was phased in over the course 
of the first year.
■■ Additional pay for the additional time: Teachers 
earn a stipend for the additional hours. In some 
cases this is annualized toward retirement; in other 
cases, it does not contribute to their retirement earn-
ings. In addition, several districts offered perfor-
mance pay for teams of teachers (or in some cases, 
the entire school staff) based on increases in student 
achievement.
■■ Professional Development: Turnaround school 
staff receive additional professional development 
hours throughout the year. Oftentimes, the agree-
ment identified specific professional development 
content. Most common was a requirement for addi-
tional training in Sheltered English Immersion or 
instruction for English Language Learners. 
Partners
Several districts noted that partners were core to the 
development and implementation of their turnaround 
plan. Some of the key partnerships cited include: 
■■ Achievement Network
■■ Center for Collaborative Education
■■ City Connects 
■■ City Year
■■ The District Management Council
■■ Focus On Results 
■■ Mass 2020
■■ Teach Plus15
These are strong organizations with varying expertise, 
but shared track records of success. No distinction was 
made (in the interview questions or in the responses) 
about the role of these partners as lead or supporting 
partners. 
One district noted: “Our partners have worked collab-
oratively to align their work with the district’s goals 
and expectations. Each partner has a specific and 
unique function but only one goal: improve student 
achievement.” 
 National research articulates a role for lead partners, 
including performance contracts through which the 
partner is accountable to the central office in a district. 
Often those partners are managed by a special unit 
within the central office. 
Further analysis will be required to determine the most 
effective partnerships. In addition, a deeper review of 
the turnaround process will be necessary to track the 
partnership contract and funds expended, which this 
report does not attempt to do.
The Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education 
All of the Superintendents referenced assistance from 
the Department of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion (DESE) and referred to the support from staff as 
“invaluable.” “Having a former superintendent [Dr. 
Karla Baehr] leading the turnaround work made all 
the difference.” Staff members in the turnaround office 
were repeatedly cited as “going the extra mile” and 
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2. Capacity
Districts cited ambitious timelines, and voiced 
concerns over the looming prospect of adding Level 
4 schools. This seemed to stem from human capital 
challenges, and district and state capacity to support 
school turnaround without compromising the work in 
other schools. 
The state’s Race to the Top plan calls for the develop-
ment of a cadre of skilled partners with the capacity 
to support turnarounds, and support district efforts to 
improve all schools. Given the timing of the first round 
of turnaround, the state’s ability to broker these part-
nerships was limited, and informal. By now, however, 
the state has built a set of approved vendors and 
partners. 
The state has not yet established a mechanism to 
connect turnaround partners with schools in need. 
The original Race to the Top proposal called for the 
establishment of a turnaround intermediary. However, 
concerns about the long-term financial sustainability 
of such an organization have led the DESE to consider 
alternatives to establishing that external intermedi-
ary. The DESE should further develop strategies for 
building turnaround capacity within districts and 
should ensure that there exists an ability to attract and 
develop a cadre of external “lead” turnaround part-
ners and to successfully connect schools and expert 
partners.
Building the capacity of external partners to support 
districts in this work could help alleviate this tension. 
The DESE should identify its strategy for building the 
turnaround function, including growing and recruiting 
turnaround partners.
3. What happens next? 
Level 4 schools have three years to turnaround 
(defined as meeting growth and proficiency goals set 
by the state). If, at the end of three years, schools have 
not improved enough, they may be identified as Level 
5, which could result in state receivership. What that 
means, and how that process will be managed (includ-
ing who the external receivers might be) is not yet 
clear. The DESE is working on its Level 5 strategy, and 
that will become critical within the next year as schools 
potentially move closer to Level 5.
■■ Evaluation: Agreements on evaluation link teacher 
and administrator evaluation to indicators of 
student learning and, in some instances “turn-
around indicators.” In several instances, the agree-
ment is to use the state’s new evaluation framework 
and model system. 
Challenges that Remain
1. Level 3 schools 
Several Superintendents raised the issue of Level 3 
schools, and indicated that meeting the needs of the 
Level 4 schools may have come at some cost to the 
Level 3 schools. (The nine districts with Level 4 schools 
are home to 50% of the Level 3 schools.) One noted: 
“The district pooled resources to ensure that our Level 
4 schools had everything they needed. This has put 
a burden on the district and has caused some resent-
ment in other schools not identified for improvement.” 
Districts with large numbers of turnarounds indicated 
that the focus on a large number of Level 4 schools 
diverted focus from Level 3 schools.
While additional study of the Level 3 schools is 
needed, the 2011 MCAS data show that 135 Level 3 
schools increased the percentage of students scoring 
Warning or Failing on the 2011 ELA MCAS and 138 
increased the Warning/Failing percentages in Math. 
Eighty-eight Level 3 schools (almost 33%) had an 
increase in the percentage of students scoring Warn-
ing or Failing on the MCAS in both ELA and math and 
had growth percentiles at or below the average (60%).
Only 2.6% of the Level 3 schools demonstrated high 
growth in ELA, and 6.3% demonstrated high growth in 
Math.
The state should consider how implementing its Race 
to the Top plan will address the concerns raised by 
Superintendents about the need to prevent Level 3 
schools from falling into a Level 4 designation. The 
investments in the District and School Assistance 
Centers and the recent award of Wraparound School 
planning grants was designed to address whether that 
kind of investment can prevent Level 3 schools from 
becoming Level 4, but a larger, more systemic response 
is needed, particularly in the lowest performing Level 
3 schools.
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to learn from districts that were “ahead” on the turn-
around effort. The state should look at districts’ vision 
and strategy for turnaround, and ensure that this 
next round of Level 4 schools can benefit from that 
experience.
In particular, further analysis should be conducted 
to determine the link between staffing flexibility and 
the pace of turnaround. The current sample size is too 
small to draw any firm conclusions, and with only one 
year of data it would be difficult to definitively iden-
tify staffing as a key contributor to the turnaround. 
However, given that nearly all interviewed Superin-
tendents, and an anecdotal sampling of principals indi-
cated that this autonomy was critical to them, it merits 
further study. If staffing flexibility can be linked to 
accelerated turnaround, the state should partner with 
districts to develop new staffing policies in partnership 
with their local teachers unions.
Conversely, if a school improves enough to move 
out of turnaround status, it runs the risk of losing the 
autonomies that contributed to its improvement. State 
regulations give the Commissioner of Elementary 
and Secondary Education the authority to identify 
and continue working conditions in the former Level 
4 schools for two-year cycles. Schools that are show-
ing gains are already beginning to ask whether being 
on track to turnaround means that they lose the abil-
ity to sustain these hard won gains. (A number of 
turnaround agreements with the districts note that 
the agreements cease when the turnaround period 
ends.) Clarity on this issue and options for schools (e.g. 
conversion to innovation school status) would be help-
ful to the Level 4 schools.
4. Additional study
As the DESE prepares to identify another round of 
Level 4 schools, learning what’s working in the current 
cohort of schools will be critical. Several districts indi-
cated that they wish there had been an opportunity 
Detailed Performance Results from Turnaround Schools
Note: not every turnaround school is listed in this section, though this analysis is followed by a detailed chart that includes 
every Level 4 school. All schools were included in the aggregate analysis. Here, groups of schools are highlighted.
Making Progress: Three of the 34 turnaround schools showed progress on all key indicators of turnaround success 
for both English Language Arts and Mathematics with a reduction in the percent of students scoring warning/
failing, an increased in Composite Performance Index (CPI) and a Student Growth Percentile of 60 or higher, 
showing the students at these schools progressed at a faster rate than 60% of their academic peers statewide.
English Language Arts Math
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Springfield Alfred G. Zanetti -8 +9 66 -21 +17 82
Lynn EJ Harrington -7 +7 69 -13 +11 72
Boston
Orchard Gardens 
School
-5 +5 63 -17 +14 79
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English Language Arts Math
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Worcester
Chandler 
Elementary 
Community
-14 +8 51.5 -17 +11 52
Worcester Union hill School -14 +7 49.5 -14 +12 56
Springfield Elias Brookings -10 +8 47 -12 +13 46.5
Springfield Gerena -10 +6 46.5 -27 +13 59
Boston Dearborn School -9 +6 54 -7 +4 60
Boston
Elihu Greenwood 
School
-7 +7 52 -10 +7 43
Springfield White Street -5 +4 45 -8 +5 48
English Language Arts Math
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Springfield
High School of 
Commerce
-5 +9 35.5 -4 +1 30
Springfield Brightwood -4 0 30 -20 +11 32
Springfield
John F. Kennedy 
Middle
0 -1 34 0 0 35
English Language Arts Math
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Boston Harbor School -9 +6 54.5 +2 -1 44
Boston The English High -1 +3 47.5 +2 -1 45
Boston
John P. Holland 
School
+2 -1 35 -6 +3 48
Boston
Paul A. Dever 
School
+3 -4 48 -15 +10 68
An additional seven turnaround schools reduced the percent of students scoring Warning/Failing in both ELA 
and Math and increased their Composite Performance Index, which captures the growth toward Proficiency 
and had a median SGP between 40 and 60, meaning their progress was about the same as academically-similar 
students statewide.
Uncertain: Three schools showed progress on some key performance indicators, but had lower growth compared 
to students statewide.
An additional four schools—all in Boston—showed progress in one subject or the other, but not both and demon-
strated average relative growth.
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English Language Arts Math
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Change in % 
Failing Change in CPI
Student Growth 
Percentile
Fall River
Henry Lord 
School
+3 -2 49 +2 -2 66
Springfield The English High +3 -3 26 +3 -1 27
Springfield
John P. Holland 
School
+3 -3 32 +2 -3 30
School Turnaround Questions
District Superintendents were asked to respond to the following questions: 
 1. Were the tools provided by the 2010 Education 
Reform Legislation helpful to you in developing 
your turnaround plan? Were they enough or the 
right tools?
 2. When you started the turnaround process, did 
you replace the principals of the Level 4 schools? 
 3. When you started the turnaround process, did 
you have the human capital you needed to staff 
the turnaround schools, and support them? Do 
you have that now? 
 4. What happened to the teachers who were not 
rehired at the Level 4 School: were they reas-
signed within the district, or dismissed? 
 5. In schools using the transformation model 
approximately what percentage of teachers chose 
to return or was asked to return? 
 6. In schools using the turnaround model approxi-
mately what percentage of teachers chose to 
return or was asked to return? 
 7. Have you observed a difference in the pace of 
turnarounds that may be linked to the model of 
turnaround (e.g. turnaround, in which no more 
than 50% of teachers are rehired or transforma-
tion, which offers greater flexibility in retaining/
rehiring staff)?
 8. In the schools where there were observable 
student performance improvements, does it 
appear as though staffing flexibilities played 
a role? If so, could you generally describe the 
impact?
 9. How will the new educator evaluation system 
accelerate the turnaround process (or will it)? 
Will there be any immediate impact on the other 
schools in your district?
 10. How would you characterize the technical 
assistance you or your team has received from 
the DESE? Do you have any comments to share 
about the future of that support?
 11. How will the turnaround gains be sustained after 
the school improvement grant funds are gone?
 12. Looking back over the last year, if you could 
restart the clock, what do you wish had been 
handled differently (by the state, your district, 
the schools, etc.)? 
 13. Do you have other comments on the RTTT work 
that we should include (e.g. about educator eval-
uation? Data systems and tools? Common Core?) 
Stalled: Three turnaround schools were stalled to show progress in either ELA or Math, with the exception of the 
Henry Lord Middle School, which showed high growth in Math.
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English Language Arts Math Change from 2010 to 2011
2010 2011 2010 2011 ELA Math
District School Name W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP
Lynn E J Harrington 28 61.0 42 21 67.5 69 35 57.0 49 22 68.2 72 -7 7 69 -13 11 72
Springfield Alfred G. Zanetti 18 71.9 62.5 10 81.3 66 36 56.9 59 15 74.2 82 -8 9 66 -21 17 82
Boston Orchard Gardens School 33 58.7 52 28 63.9 63 50 50.4 63 33 63.9 79 -5 5 63 -17 14 79
Fall River John J. Doran 38 54.5 36 30 60.2 62 39 54.7 47 35 58.8 52 -8 6 62 -4 4 52
Lowell Charlotte M. Murkland Elementary 31 57.5 22 19 65.7 57 29 60.4 31.5 14 74.8 80 -12 8 57 -15 14 80
Lynn Connery 35 61.1 45.5 29 69.8 57 36 59.5 50.5 37 67.3 61.5 -6 9 57 1 8 61.5
Boston Harbor School 21 72.3 41 12 78 54.5 46 52.3 49 48 51.4 44 -9 6 54.5 2 -1 44
Boston Dearborn School 34 58.8 45 25 64.5 54 52 48.3 58 45 51.8 60 -9 6 54 -7 4 60
Holyoke Morgan Elementary 47 49.0 44.5 30 56.9 53 67 35.6 53 48 45.3 67.5 -17 8 53 -19 10 67.5
Boston Elihu Greenwood School 28 57.2 27 21 64.6 52 39 55.4 37.5 29 61.9 43 -7 7 52 -10 7 43
Boston William Monroe Trotter 26 62.6 64.5 23 60.7 52 42 51.1 64 34 55.1 69 -3 -2 52 -8 4 69
Worcester Chandler Elementary Community 45 50.9 33.5 31 59 51.5 51 46.2 49 34 56.9 52 -14 8 51.5 -17 11 52
Worcester Union Hill School 32 57.0 40 18 64.3 49.5 40 51.3 54 26 63.2 56 -14 7 49.5 -14 12 56
Fall River Henry Lord Middle 13 79.1 52 16 77.3 49 24 68.9 73 26 66.7 66 3 -2 49 2 -2 66
Boston Paul A. Dever School 31 58.4 59 34 54.4 48 38 56.1 58.5 23 65.7 68 3 -4 48 -15 10 68
Fall River Matthew J. Kuss Middle School 12 82.5 49 8 83.1 48 25 72.1 68 23 71 62 -4 1 48 -2 -1 62
Boston The English High 17 73.1 39 16 75.7 47.5 25 66.6 37 27 65.6 45 -1 3 47.5 2 -1 45
Springfield Elias Brookings 47 54.5 41.5 37 62.2 47 53 48.6 31 41 61.3 46.5 -10 8 47 -12 13 46.5
Springfield Gerena 56 44.9 41 46 50.8 46.5 80 32.3 30 53 45.7 59 -10 6 46.5 -27 13 59
Springfield White Street 34 55.4 45 29 59.7 45 33 57.4 52.5 25 62.5 48 -5 4 45 -8 5 48
Boston
UP Academy  
(formerly Patrick F. Gavin Middle)
32 71.5 31 33 71.8 41 43 64.9 60 48 61.6 52 1 0 41 5 -3 52
Lawrence Arlington Elementary School 26 64.1 39 22 61.6 39.5 32 59.4 48 28 61.6 44 -4 -2 39.5 -4 2 44
Springfield Homer Street 40 51.9 22 22 63.1 39.5 53 43.6 24.5 28 59.9 47 -18 11 39.5 -25 16 47
Boston Blackstone School 36 53.5 39 38 52.6 38  32 57.7 2 -1 38
Lawrence South Lawrence East Middle 21 73.7 47 23 71.3 37 47 54.1 34 48 57.2 30.5 2 -2 37 1 3 30.5
Holyoke
Wm. J. Dean Vocational Technical High 
School
27 68.4 29 20 72.3 35.5 40 62.9 31 35 62.8 49.5 -7 4 35.5 -5 0 49.5
Springfield High School of Commerce 19 72.4 26 14 81 35.5 42 59.9 26 38 60.6 30 -5 9 35.5 -4 1 30
Boston John P. Holland School 35 56.2 33.5 37 55.3 35 40 57.0 51 34 59.8 48 2 -1 35 -6 3 48
Chelsea Chelsea High School 13 76.6 40 10 81 34 25 67.8 32 18 73.8 41 -3 4 34 -7 6 41
Springfield John F. Kennedy Middle 21 70.2 37 21 69.4 34 57 44.3 28 57 44.5 35 0 -1 34 0 0 35
Boston John F. Kennedy School 22 63.2 40.5 22 65.9 32 27 65.2 51 13 78.9 62 0 3 32 -14 14 62
Springfield Chestnut Street Middle 29 68.6 41 32 65.8 32 58 50.3 31 60 47.1 30 3 -3 32 2 -3 30
Boston Jeremiah E. Burke High School 21 65.3 28 16 71.9 30.5 26 60.8 20 21 65.8 51.5 -5 7 30.5 -5 5 51.5
Springfield Brightwood 43 50.8 32 39 50.9 30 66 37.1 8 46 48.4 32 -4 0 30 -20 11 32
Springfield M. Marcus Kiley Middle School 24 66.3 33 27 63.3 26 56 43.5 29.5 59 42.3 27 3 -3 26 3 -1 27
ELA Math
Median Turnaround School 29.0 61.1 40.0 23.0 64.6 47.0 40.0 55.8 48.5 34.0 61.6 51.8 -6 3 7 -6 6 3
27T o w a r d  C l o s i n g  t h e  A c h i e v e m e n t  G a p
English Language Arts Math Change from 2010 to 2011
2010 2011 2010 2011 ELA Math
District School Name W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP W/F % CPI SGP
Lynn E J Harrington 28 61.0 42 21 67.5 69 35 57.0 49 22 68.2 72 -7 7 69 -13 11 72
Springfield Alfred G. Zanetti 18 71.9 62.5 10 81.3 66 36 56.9 59 15 74.2 82 -8 9 66 -21 17 82
Boston Orchard Gardens School 33 58.7 52 28 63.9 63 50 50.4 63 33 63.9 79 -5 5 63 -17 14 79
Fall River John J. Doran 38 54.5 36 30 60.2 62 39 54.7 47 35 58.8 52 -8 6 62 -4 4 52
Lowell Charlotte M. Murkland Elementary 31 57.5 22 19 65.7 57 29 60.4 31.5 14 74.8 80 -12 8 57 -15 14 80
Lynn Connery 35 61.1 45.5 29 69.8 57 36 59.5 50.5 37 67.3 61.5 -6 9 57 1 8 61.5
Boston Harbor School 21 72.3 41 12 78 54.5 46 52.3 49 48 51.4 44 -9 6 54.5 2 -1 44
Boston Dearborn School 34 58.8 45 25 64.5 54 52 48.3 58 45 51.8 60 -9 6 54 -7 4 60
Holyoke Morgan Elementary 47 49.0 44.5 30 56.9 53 67 35.6 53 48 45.3 67.5 -17 8 53 -19 10 67.5
Boston Elihu Greenwood School 28 57.2 27 21 64.6 52 39 55.4 37.5 29 61.9 43 -7 7 52 -10 7 43
Boston William Monroe Trotter 26 62.6 64.5 23 60.7 52 42 51.1 64 34 55.1 69 -3 -2 52 -8 4 69
Worcester Chandler Elementary Community 45 50.9 33.5 31 59 51.5 51 46.2 49 34 56.9 52 -14 8 51.5 -17 11 52
Worcester Union Hill School 32 57.0 40 18 64.3 49.5 40 51.3 54 26 63.2 56 -14 7 49.5 -14 12 56
Fall River Henry Lord Middle 13 79.1 52 16 77.3 49 24 68.9 73 26 66.7 66 3 -2 49 2 -2 66
Boston Paul A. Dever School 31 58.4 59 34 54.4 48 38 56.1 58.5 23 65.7 68 3 -4 48 -15 10 68
Fall River Matthew J. Kuss Middle School 12 82.5 49 8 83.1 48 25 72.1 68 23 71 62 -4 1 48 -2 -1 62
Boston The English High 17 73.1 39 16 75.7 47.5 25 66.6 37 27 65.6 45 -1 3 47.5 2 -1 45
Springfield Elias Brookings 47 54.5 41.5 37 62.2 47 53 48.6 31 41 61.3 46.5 -10 8 47 -12 13 46.5
Springfield Gerena 56 44.9 41 46 50.8 46.5 80 32.3 30 53 45.7 59 -10 6 46.5 -27 13 59
Springfield White Street 34 55.4 45 29 59.7 45 33 57.4 52.5 25 62.5 48 -5 4 45 -8 5 48
Boston
UP Academy  
(formerly Patrick F. Gavin Middle)
32 71.5 31 33 71.8 41 43 64.9 60 48 61.6 52 1 0 41 5 -3 52
Lawrence Arlington Elementary School 26 64.1 39 22 61.6 39.5 32 59.4 48 28 61.6 44 -4 -2 39.5 -4 2 44
Springfield Homer Street 40 51.9 22 22 63.1 39.5 53 43.6 24.5 28 59.9 47 -18 11 39.5 -25 16 47
Boston Blackstone School 36 53.5 39 38 52.6 38  32 57.7 2 -1 38
Lawrence South Lawrence East Middle 21 73.7 47 23 71.3 37 47 54.1 34 48 57.2 30.5 2 -2 37 1 3 30.5
Holyoke
Wm. J. Dean Vocational Technical High 
School
27 68.4 29 20 72.3 35.5 40 62.9 31 35 62.8 49.5 -7 4 35.5 -5 0 49.5
Springfield High School of Commerce 19 72.4 26 14 81 35.5 42 59.9 26 38 60.6 30 -5 9 35.5 -4 1 30
Boston John P. Holland School 35 56.2 33.5 37 55.3 35 40 57.0 51 34 59.8 48 2 -1 35 -6 3 48
Chelsea Chelsea High School 13 76.6 40 10 81 34 25 67.8 32 18 73.8 41 -3 4 34 -7 6 41
Springfield John F. Kennedy Middle 21 70.2 37 21 69.4 34 57 44.3 28 57 44.5 35 0 -1 34 0 0 35
Boston John F. Kennedy School 22 63.2 40.5 22 65.9 32 27 65.2 51 13 78.9 62 0 3 32 -14 14 62
Springfield Chestnut Street Middle 29 68.6 41 32 65.8 32 58 50.3 31 60 47.1 30 3 -3 32 2 -3 30
Boston Jeremiah E. Burke High School 21 65.3 28 16 71.9 30.5 26 60.8 20 21 65.8 51.5 -5 7 30.5 -5 5 51.5
Springfield Brightwood 43 50.8 32 39 50.9 30 66 37.1 8 46 48.4 32 -4 0 30 -20 11 32
Springfield M. Marcus Kiley Middle School 24 66.3 33 27 63.3 26 56 43.5 29.5 59 42.3 27 3 -3 26 3 -1 27
ELA Math
Median Turnaround School 29.0 61.1 40.0 23.0 64.6 47.0 40.0 55.8 48.5 34.0 61.6 51.8 -6 3 7 -6 6 3
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V.
Charter Schools
Key Provisions
An Act Relative to the Achievement Gap included a 
“smart cap lift,” doubling the number of charter school 
seats available in the lowest performing districts from 
9% of district net school spending to 18%. New seats 
will be phased in between 2011 and 2012 (with the 
cap lifting to 12 percent in 2011 and increasing by 1% 
annually thereafter). Only “proven providers” with 
Theory of Change:
Scale what works and connect the highest performing charter schools with the 
neediest students by lifting the cap in the lowest performing districts and monitor-
ing their efforts to recruit and retain the most vulnerable subgroups.
Progress:
In one year, the state has identified high performing “proven providers” and 
has approved a dramatic expansion of charters, especially in Boston. Yet there is 
continued need to connect high performing charters to students in the Gateway 
Cities.16
Fidelity of Implementation:
The replication in Boston fulfills the spirit of the legislation by replicating in one 
of the neediest districts, but the promise of charters in other low performing urban 
districts has not yet been fulfilled. 
Summary:
Charter school students continue to outperform their peers in district schools, 
including on the 2011 MCAS exams. Sixteen new charters have been approved and 
thousands more students are enrolling in charter schools, mostly in Boston.
Critics of charters have long contended that charters do not enroll the most 
challenging students, and the education reform law put a number of processes in 
place to ensure that English Language Learners and Special Education Students 
can access and succeed in charter schools across the state. Enrollment data 
(available in November 2011) will demonstrate enrollment patterns for charter 
schools. In the meantime, there has been a move to serve English Language 
Learners (notably from the Match Community Day School, which will specialize 
in serving ELL students in grades K-12).
Recommendations:
 1. Create incentives for proven providers to open charters in the Gateway Cities, 
and support the development of a human capital pipeline of prospective 
charter leaders.
 2. Identify strategies to connect charters to unused school facilities.
 3. Review the statutory language related to Horace Mann Charters and ease 
barriers to start up. Consider strategies to incent the creation of new Horace 
Mann Charters.
 4. Strengthen state capacity to support a rigorous application and accountability 
process for charter schools.
track records of running successful schools are eligible 
to apply for the new charters. To address criticisms 
that charter schools do not recruit or retain the needi-
est students, new reporting provisions were included 
in the statute that require schools to report on their 
work to recruit and retain critical subgroups, including 
English Language Learners. If schools don’t meet their 
recruitment and retention goals, the Board can revoke 
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its charter. Finally, if a student leaves a charter school 
before completing the highest grade within that that 
school, the school is required to “back fill” that seat, 
provided the vacancy occurs within the first half of the 
grades served.
Charter Schools: By the Numbers
■■ 42 charter school prospectuses were submitted in 
August 2010 and in September 2010; 25 of those 42 
were invited by the Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education to submit final proposals for 
consideration. 23 final applications were submitted 
in November.
■■ On February 28, 2011 16 new charters were granted 
by the Board of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion, the highest number of charters ever granted 
in Massachusetts in a single year.17
■■ The 16 schools included Commonwealth Charters 
and Horace Mann Charter Schools. Commonwealth 
Charter Schools operate independently of the local 
school district. Horace Mann Charter Schools are 
developed and operated in close cooperation with 
the host school district, and require approval of the 
local school committee.
Noteworthy Accomplishments 
■■ New regulations for charter schools were adopted, 
which defined proven providers and outlined 
new requirements for tracking student enroll-
ments, as well as school recruitment and retention 
plans for sub-populations of students (including 
English Language Learners and Special Education 
Students).
■■ DESE began collecting policies and procedures 
related to English Language Learners from each 
school as part of the school opening process.
■■ DESE staff with expertise in English Language 
Learners have been a part of the chartering process, 
which means that charter schools now can get feed-
back on their plans to serve ELL students as part of 
the application process.
■■ All new and existing charter schools have submitted 
recruitment and retention plans to the DESE that 
describe their outreach to and support for student 
subgroups.
■■ Greater focus on English Language Learners 
prompted the Match Charter School to apply for, 
and successfully receive, a charter to open the Match 
Community Day School, a K-12 school designed 
specifically to serve English Language Learners that 
is operated in partnership and consultation with 
Community Day School in Lawrence, which has a 
track record of serving ELL students well. 
Data
In 2010–2011, there were 63 Commonwealth and 
Horace Mann Charters across the state. Fifty percent of 
the students enrolled in charters are considered “low 
income,” compared to 34.2% statewide. The percentage 
of low-income students is significantly higher in the 
urban areas. In Boston, 72% of the students enrolled 
in charters are low income (compared to 74% in the 
Boston Public Schools district). 
Although charters enroll a comparable number of 
students whose first language is not English (14.9% 
in charters, 16.3% statewide), charters do enroll 
fewer students who are classified as Limited English 
Proficient: 4.3% of charter school students are LEP, 
compared to 7.1% of the state. 
Charter schools also tend to enroll fewer Special 
Education students: 13.5% of charter school students 
are students with special needs; statewide, 17% of 
students are classified as having special needs.
The new law required greater accountability for 
subgroup enrollment and retention. It also granted 
charters access—for the first time—to school district 
mailing lists, which may provide access to families 
with whom charters have struggled to connect in the 
past. When school enrollment data becomes available 
in late November of 2011, it will establish an important 
benchmark to determine whether charters are enroll-
ing greater numbers of vulnerable subgroups.
The replicating charters enroll a higher percentage 
of English Language Learners than other charters. 
Community Day Charter Public School enrolls the 
highest percentage of Limited English Proficient, 
though both Excel Academy Charter School and KIPP 
Academy Lynn enroll large percentages of students 
whose first language is not English. All of the replicat-
ing charters enroll larger percentages of low-income 
students. 
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Selected Student Subgroups in Replicating Charter Schools18
School
% First 
Language  
Not English
% Limited 
English 
Proficient
% Students 
with 
Disabilities
% Low 
Income18
% Free 
Lunch
% African 
American % Hispanic
State Average 16.3 7.1 17 34.2 29.1 8.2 15.4
Community Day Charter Public School 82.5 35.3 16.3 69.8 54.1 1.2 89.4
Edward Brooke Charter School 12 0.2 7.3 78 61.6 72.2 22.4
Excel Academy Charter School 44.8 2.8 13.7 72.2 49.1 4.7 71.7
KIPP Academy Lynn Charter School 38.1 1.6 10.5 88.9 79.2 25.1 55.1
MATCH Charter Public School 15.7 0 15.9 77 62.2 61.1 32
Roxbury Preparatory Charter School 35.8 1.9 16.7 73.5 62.6 58.4 40.1
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The horizontal line represents the statewide average Proficiency rate for ELA. 
The vertical line represents a student growth percentile of 60%; anything above that is considered high growth by the DESE.
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English Language Arts Growth & Proficiency for Charter Schools
Highlights from the 2011 MCAS
■■ 46 charters demonstrate high rates of students scoring Proficient or above in English Language Arts. A high 
rate of Proficient or above is defined as exceeding the state average rate of 69%.
■■ 16 charter schools demonstrated “high growth” in English Language Arts, which means their students’ growth 
was better than 60% of their academic peers statewide.
■■ 16 charters demonstrated high growth and high rates of proficiency in English Language Arts, including the 
following replicators: Community Day in Lawrence and Boston’s Edward Brooke, Excel, Match, and Roxbury 
Prep.
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Highlights from the 2011 MCAS
■■ 37 charters demonstrate high rates of students scoring Proficient or above. A high rate of Proficient or above is 
defined as exceeding the state average of 58%.
■■ 27 charter schools demonstrated “high growth,” which means their students’ growth was better than 60% of 
their academic peers statewide.
■■ 22 charters demonstrated high growth and high rates of proficiency, including the following replicators: 
Community Day in Lawrence and Boston’s Edward Brooke, Excel, Match, and Roxbury Preparatory.
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The horizontal line represents the statewide average proficiency rate in Math. 
The vertical line represents a student growth percentile of 60%; anything above that is considered high growth by the DESE.
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Math Growth & Proficiency for Charter Schools
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Available Seats
■■ Fall River: 1,143
■■ Lowell: 1,800 
■■ Lynn: 1,700 
■■ New Bedford: 1,348 
■■ Springfield: 3,000 
■■ Worcester: 2,800 22
These Gateway Cities have not enjoyed the same 
flood of interest from charter operators to launch new 
schools. Anecdotal conversations with charter opera-
tors suggest that this is (in part) attributable to the 
challenges related to opening a second school and 
wanting to remain in close geographic proximity to 
the first school. There are also issues related to human 
capital: Boston is home to, and perhaps better able to 
attract, social entrepreneurs and experienced educa-
tors interested in opening a new charter school. And 
finally, the more robust philanthropic base in Boston 
(including a new $12 million charter replication fund 
launched by the New Schools Venture Fund) offers 
Boston charters the opportunity to access critical plan-
ning and supplementary funds that may not be avail-
able in other districts.
The state is currently awaiting full charter applica-
tions from groups proposing new charters. There has 
already been one level of screening, resulting in the 
founders of five Commonwealth Charters and two 
Horace Mann Charters submitting full charter applica-
tions. The applications were due November 7, 2011. Of 
the applicants for Commonwealth Charters:
■■ Two propose to locate in Springfield (potentially 
serving up to 1,630 students); 
■■ One is a regional school (which would serve 500 
students in Holyoke, West Springfield, Chicopee, 
Westfield, South Hadley and Northampton); 
■■ One school would locate in Lowell (potentially serv-
ing 1,200 students); and 
■■ One school would locate in Somerville (potentially 
serving 450 new students).
The Horace Mann applicants are applying for 
in-district charters in Boston. 
(Note: the state did not accept applications for Boston 
this year because Boston is well above the 12% cap; 
the DESE has indicated that in future application 
Challenges that Remain
1. Replicating: Dramatic growth in Boston
Replicating high performing charters was central to 
the reform legislation which sought to connect success-
ful schools with the neediest students. In response, 
some districts witnessed a virtual land-grab of open 
charter seats. In Boston, more than 4,500 seats were 
chartered (800 seats were chartered in Lawrence, 360 
in New Bedford, and 324 in Springfield). In good faith, 
the Department of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion chartered out almost all available seats, including 
“provisional” or future seats. There are only roughly 
1,000 unclaimed seats available for Boston; mean-
while, some of the city’s highest performing charters 
are growing into networks of two to four schools. The 
Boston replicating charters have an impressive track 
record of serving students of color and low-income 
students. All of the Boston replicating charters have 
high growth and high proficiency rates. 
The scatter plots on the previous page show the profi-
ciency and growth rates in English Language Arts and 
Math for low-income students in the public schools in 
Boston. The charters that have been approved to repli-
cate in Boston are all in the “high growth/high profi-
ciency rates” quadrant.20
These charts suggest that the replicating charters 
are achieving impressive results with low-income 
students. Additional analysis should consider whether 
the proficiency and growth rates for English Language 
Learners and Students with Disabilities are as impres-
sive at the replicating charters.
Thanks to the legislation, low-income students in 
Boston now have more options, though demand still 
appears to be greater than supply. There were 11,000 
entrants into the 2011 lottery for Boston charters, 
signaling tremendous unmet demand on the part of 
parents.21
Nearly all of the replication, however, was in Boston 
(which is again close to the new charter cap). Other 
urban districts, with the exception of Lawrence (which 
is within 500 seats of its cap) are not close to their caps, 
meaning there is room for new charters. DESE data 
suggests that there are large numbers of seats available 
in districts with Level 4 schools: 
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date: two in Boston (which will ultimately enroll over 
1,000 students and one in Salem, which will enroll 125 
students).23 One Horace Mann is being operated by an 
organization from outside the district; the other two 
were developed by individuals inside the district. As 
part of the opening process, these new Horace Mann 
charters have negotiated waivers from the district’s 
existing collective bargaining agreement which has 
slowed the planning and opening process. In addition, 
there is a provision in the legislation that will require 
the signoff of local bargaining unit leadership when 
the school applies for its second charter. Charters 
last for five years, and at the end of that time, when 
the school applies for renewal, the local union Presi-
dent will need to sign off on that proposal unless the 
language in the statute is changed.
In creating this new type of Horace Mann Charter 
School, there was an opportunity to do away with the 
requirement that amendments to Horace Mann char-
ters be approved by local bargaining unit leadership. 
In the course of the five-year charter authorization 
period, it is common for schools to identify aspects of 
their charters that need to be amended; the Depart-
ment of Elementary and Secondary Education regu-
larly reviews and authorizes such requests (related 
to minor and major changes to the original charter, 
including grade configurations, governance structure 
(i.e. adding a Chief Operating Officer), loan approval, 
changes to bylaws, enrollment policies, number of 
seats, etc.). For Horace Mann operators, the added step 
of gaining union approval of any proposed amend-
ments represents an additional challenge, especially in 
relation to the charter renewal. Anecdotal discussions 
with outside operators indicate that the potential to 
lose their charter after five years because of union lead-
ership resistance to the model is a barrier to expansion. 
Ultimately, this provision may serve as a barrier to 
outside operators considering opening a Horace Mann. 
If the state plans to grow the number of Horace Manns, 
it should consider moving forward legislation for both 
renewal and amendment of the charters, in order to 
attract outside operators into the districts. 
Lastly, with the lifting of the cap on charter seats, 
those interested in operating charter schools have 
been able to go into the “smart cap” districts with new 
Commonwealth Charter Schools. Given the hurdles 
involved with opening Horace Mann Charters, there 
has been little incentive to pursue the Horace Mann 
processes, seats that become available under Boston’s 
18% cap will be available to applicant groups.) None 
of the proven providers from Boston are among the 
applicants for the new charter schools.
Following an interview and public hearing process, 
applications will be voted on by the Board of Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education at the February 28, 2012 
meeting. 
Even while the state proceeds with the current char-
ter application process, it must consider strategies for 
attracting proven providers to other urban districts, 
especially districts with large numbers of Level 4 or 
low-performing Level 3 schools.
2. Facilities challenges for replicating charters
One of the greatest challenges for new charter schools 
is finding an appropriate facility that is affordable 
and can accommodate a school and its students. The 
reform act stated that districts may “prior to consider-
ation of any other disposition of the identified excess 
capacity, make a good faith offer to sell or lease at 
fair market value the identified excess capacity to a 
Commonwealth Charter School.” 
Having access to unused school buildings is poten-
tially very helpful to ensuring a successful school 
launch for new charter schools. In Boston, the sign-
ing of the Boston Public Schools & Charter School 
Compact has led to the possibility of the district leas-
ing up to three buildings to Boston charters. This is a 
promising start, though will not fully meet the demand 
of charters in Boston.
Charter growth may be slowed if charters cannot 
access unused school buildings. To support charter 
growth, addressing the access to unused school build-
ings will be critical. 
3. Increasing the numbers of in-district Horace 
Mann Charters
The reform legislation created a new type of Horace 
Mann Charter, or in-district charter school: 14 Horace 
Manns could be started without local union leader-
ship sign-off. This seemed to be a promising strategy 
for opening an in-district charter without undue 
obstruction or delay from potentially recalcitrant 
union leaders. However, in practice, only three of 
these new Horace Manns have been chartered to 
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has produced some of the highest performing charters 
in the country.
Capacity within the agency to support large numbers 
of new charter schools is limited, and the charter 
school office has taken on new responsibilities without 
dramatically increasing their staffing levels. In addi-
tion, the state no longer has support from a federal 
grant program that it historically used to support the 
development, planning and implementation of new 
schools. This resource was critical to newly forming 
schools and organizations seeking charters, especially 
for those schools outside of Boston.
The state should consider whether it has the capacity 
to manage growth and accountability of quality charter 
schools. 
model, unless there is an explicit mission-driven inter-
est in operating in-district schools. As Commonwealth 
charters expand and the new caps on seats are reached, 
Horace Mann charters may become increasingly 
sought by proven providers who currently operate 
outside of the school district.
4. Capacity of the authorizer to support the prolif-
eration of charters
Massachusetts charter law is considered to be one of 
the strongest in the nation, in part because of the single 
state authorizer. The Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education’s process has, with few excep-
tions, been a transparent and objective process, and 
New Commonwealth Charter Schools
School Location Grades
Number of 
Students Opening
Alma del Mar Charter School New Bedford K–8 360 Fall 2011
Bridge Boston Charter School Boston K1–8 335 Fall 2011
Community day Charter Public School - Riverside Lawrence K1–8 400 Fall 2012
Community Day Charter Public School - South Lawrence K1–8 400 Fall 2012
Dorchester Preparatory Charter School Boston 5–12 600 Fall 2012
Edward W. Brooke Charter School 2 Boston K–8 475 Fall 2011
Edward W. Brooke Charter School 3 Boston and Chelsea K–8 475 Fall 2012
Excel Academy Charter School - Boston II Boston 5–12 448 Fall 2012
Excel Academy Charter School - Chelsea Chelsea 5–8 224 Fall 2011
Grove Hall Preparatory Charter School Boston 5–12 600 Fall 2011
KIPP Academy Boston Charter School Boston K–8 588 Fall 2012
MATCH Community Day Charter Public School Boston K1–12 700 Fall 2011
Veritas Preparatory Charter School Springfield 5–8 324 Fall 2012
Horace Mann Charter Schools
School Location Grades
Number of 
Students Opening
Boston Green Academy Boston 6–12 595 Fall 2011
Salem Community Charter School Salem 9–12 125 Fall 2011
UP Academy Boston 6–8 500 Fall 2011

37T o w a r d  C l o s i n g  t h e  A c h i e v e m e n t  G a p
VI.
Innovation Schools
to collective bargaining agreements); professional 
development; and school district policies. Innovation 
schools were modeled after Boston’s pilot schools.
The first innovation school in Massachusetts was the 
Paul Revere School in Revere, which opened its doors 
as an innovation school in September 2010. Other inno-
vation schools that opened in the first year of operation 
include the Pathways Early College Innovation School, 
sponsored by the Mahar Regional District in collabo-
ration with Wachusett Community College, and the 
Massachusetts Virtual Academy in Greenfield.
Key Provisions
Innovation schools are a signature component of An 
Act Relative to the Achievement Gap. The creation of 
these schools provides educators and other stakehold-
ers across the state with the opportunity to create new 
in-district and charter-like schools that can implement 
creative and inventive strategies, increase student 
achievement, and reduce achievement gaps while 
keeping school funding within districts. These schools 
operate with autonomy and flexibility in six key 
areas: curriculum; budget; school schedule and calen-
dar; staffing (including waivers from or exemptions 
Theory of Change: Empower districts to innovate by creating a new type of in-district charter school that gives schools flexibility over time, staffing, budget, curricula and governance.
Progress: The first three Innovation Schools opened in September 2010. Since then, an addi-tional 16 Innovation Schools have been approved by local school committees.
Fidelity of Implementation:
18 schools have opened as innovation schools, and another has recently been 
approved. The Innovation Plans focus on serving specific populations of students, 
implementing new programming, and altering structures for teachers. While most 
of the schools have been initiated by district level leaders, it appears the Achieve-
ment Gap Act’s goal of sparking innovation within districts is gaining traction. 
Funding:
$1,500,000 from the Massachusetts Race to the Top fund and $600,000 from the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have supported planning and implementation 
efforts for new or conversion Innovation Schools. In the first round of planning 
grants, $350,000 was awarded. 
Summary: The state has awarded 24 planning grants to support 26 schools; another round of planning grants will be awarded in January 2011. 
Recommendations:
 1. Support the ongoing growth of school by brokering partnerships with Innova-
tion Schools.
 2. Urge turnaround schools to consider innovation school status as a long term 
strategy for sustaining the turnaround.
 3. Provide support to large districts with significant interest in the model.
 4. Continue providing planning and implementation support
 5. Continue efforts to publicize the model.
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Innovation schools can be established by teachers, 
school and district administrators, superintendents, 
union leaders, school committees, parents, parent-
teacher organizations, colleges and universities, 
nonprofit community-based organizations, nonprofit 
businesses or corporations, nonprofit charter school 
operators, nonprofit education management orga-
nizations, educational collaboratives, consortia of 
these groups, or other nonprofit groups authorized 
by the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary 
Education. 
Innovation schools operate according to an innovation 
plan, developed by a defined set of stakeholders and 
approved by local school boards. Innovation plans 
describe the areas of autonomy and flexibility and 
specific strategies that are to be implemented in the 
school; at least one of the six areas of autonomy and 
flexibility must be addressed in the innovation plan.
The plan must also include annual measurable goals 
that assess factors such as student achievement and 
school performance. In exchange for the author-
ity to operate the school with increased autonomy, 
innovation school operators are held responsible for 
advancing student learning and meeting these annual 
benchmarks. Innovation schools receive the same per 
pupil allocation as any other school in the district, and 
its operators can also secure grant or other types of 
supplemental funding to implement the innovation 
plan.
Innovation schools must receive two of three votes 
from a screening committee to conduct the planning 
process: Superintendent, School Committee, Union 
President. Of the 18 established schools about three-
quarters of them received the union’s vote of approval 
in the screening committee vote. All of the schools that 
are conversions also required a two-thirds vote of the 
current teachers.
The vast majority of these schools were initiated at the 
district or school level. To date, most of the innovation 
schools have been initiated by either superintendents 
or principals.
Innovation Schools: By the Numbers
At the start of the 2011–2012 School Year, 18 innova-
tion schools were in operation in 12 districts across the 
state: Boston, Dennis-Yarmouth, Falmouth, Greenfield, 
Ralph Mahar Regional, Monson, North Middlesex 
Regional, Quaboag Regional, Revere, Springfield, West 
Springfield, and Worcester (which is home to five 
innovation schools). In October 2011 Salem became the 
13th district to approve an innovation school, sched-
uled to open in 2012. 
Innovation schools are either new schools or conver-
sions of pre-existing schools; of the 18 innovation 
schools in operation, there are 14 conversions and four 
new schools.
District Response in Conversion Schools:
Discussions with a sampling of districts that have 
approved innovation schools revealed some common 
themes:
■■ Early and frequent communications and awareness 
building: District leaders report dedicating time to 
early discussions with school committee members, 
union leadership, teachers and parents. All respon-
dents emphasized the importance of early, consis-
tent communication with key stakeholders.
“We got the teachers’ union and school committee 
involved at the very beginning and as a result we were 
able to avoid most of the typical conflicts. We met 
regularly throughout the process and kept the focus on 
the best interest of students.”
“From the outset, we knew we had to lay the founda-
tion with teachers and parents and get their buy-in…
it took multiple conversations but the teachers came 
to see this was all about improving the school and 
eventually they became the biggest advocates for the 
innovation plan.”
■■ Teachers unions: Several district respondents 
reported that union leaders viewed the opening of 
an innovation school with some skepticism, while 
teachers themselves and parents responded with 
curiosity. In addition, they reported that teachers 
and parents largely embraced the idea once they 
understood the purpose, benefits, and process 
involved. This suggests a need for wider dissemi-
nation of information about the model and its 
potential. 
Innovation school planning can provide a morale boost 
to staff and build collaborative spirit within districts 
and schools. 
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Low-income: On average, innovation schools enroll the 
same percentage of low-income students as do their 
districts, with each at 54%; both are significantly higher 
than the state average of 34%.
Race/Ethnicity: Among African American students, 
innovation schools track closely to state averages: the 
schools have an average enrollment of 8.5%, while 
their districts are at 10%, and the state average is 
roughly 8%. Similarly, among Asian students innova-
tion schools are nearly identical to the state, with the 
schools’ average enrollment at 5.6% and the statewide 
average at 5.5%; districts with innovation schools have 
an average Asian student enrollment of 4%. 
Enrollment of Latino students in innovation schools, 
however, is double the state average, at 30% to 15% 
respectively, with innovation school districts falling 
in the middle with an average Latino enrollment of 
23%. A similar, though inverse, pattern is found in the 
enrollment of white students, with innovation schools 
at 52%, the state average at 68%, and the nine districts 
at 59%.
Noteworthy Accomplishments
In March 2011, the Executive Office of Education 
(EOE), in partnership with DESE, awarded 24 planning 
grants of up to $15,000 to plan for 26 new or conver-
sion innovation schools. 
■■ 18 new and conversion innovation schools were 
approved by local school committees and opened 
across the state in September 2011. (14 conversions; 
4 new.) A 19th innovation school was approved in 
October 2011. 
■■ Nine other schools have received planning grants 
and are in the process of getting local approval.
■■ The Executive Office of Education has hosted a 
number of information sessions to help build aware-
ness and understanding of the Innovation School 
Model.
■■ A second round of planning grants will be made in 
January 2012. 
“The whole process really re-energized the staff.”
“The best part of the innovation school process is that it 
brought rapid alignment among principals and teach-
ers…a united focus on every child becoming college and 
career ready.”
■■ Funding: State funding in the form of planning (up 
to $15,000) and implementation grants ($25,000–
$75,000) has been vital for districts, particularly 
in the planning stages. Districts report that state-
funded technical assistance also has been highly 
valuable.
Context: Who Enrolls in Innovation Schools?
The sample size of innovation schools is small, so it is 
difficult to draw any conclusions about the enrollment 
patterns. However, a preliminary analysis suggests 
the following enrollment characteristics of students in 
these schools. While this component of the Achieve-
ment Gap Act wasn’t specifically targeted at the most 
vulnerable subgroup, the spirit of the act intended 
to connect the neediest students to opportunity and 
promote innovation statewide. If the innovation 
school model is a strategy for connecting students to 
new structures that can better serve them, enrollment 
patterns may be worth ongoing attention.
Enrollment characteristics of Innovation 
Schools in school year 2010–201124
First Language not English/Limited English Proficient:
30% of students enrolled at innovation schools and 
20% of students in the 9 districts for whom enrollment 
data was available are students whose First Language 
is Not English, compared to 16% statewide.25 At the 
innovation schools, 21% of those students are desig-
nated as Limited English Proficient, compared to 11% 
within their districts and 7% statewide.
Special Education: Innovation schools enroll a slightly 
lower percentage of Special Education students than 
their districts, with 13.5% and 18% respectively. Across 
the state, 17% of students are classified as Special 
Education.
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the student gains. At present, Level 4 schools are not 
eligible to apply for innovation school planning grants. 
The state should reconsider this policy, and instead 
send the message that all schools should consider 
whether the model is a good fit.
3. Provide support to large districts with significant 
interest in the model
For larger districts where several innovation school 
prospectuses are under development at a given 
time, the state should explore ways to provide addi-
tional capacity to support the planning and review 
process. These districts need to dedicate staff time and 
resources to ensure innovation planning teams receive 
adequate and meaningful support, but they are already 
stretched thin on administrative capacity; further, 
these are some of the very districts where students are 
most in need of more high quality school options.
4. Continue providing planning and implementation 
support
Dedicate ongoing financial resources to the initiative. 
School design planning is intensive, time-consuming, 
and requires high quality consulting and advising, as 
well as stipend pay for teachers and others engaged. 
Continue to make resources available for planning and 
implementation, as well as the provision of technical 
assistance. 
5. Continue efforts to publicize the model
Finally, intensify efforts to inform educators and the 
general public on what innovation schools are, what 
they are not, and what the potential benefits are for 
staff and students. Include testimonies of teachers and 
parents to connect with these key constituencies.
Recommendations
1. Support ongoing growth by brokering partnerships 
with innovation schools
The goal of the innovation schools movement is to 
unleash creativity and innovation within school 
districts in order to serve students better; it is not 
innovation for the sake of innovation. The first cohort 
of schools have built innovation plans that focus on 
specific groups of students (e.g. off-track, over-age, 
out-of-school) or include unique programming (e.g. 
comprehensive arts education, dual language, Inter-
national Baccalaureate, environmental education) or a 
different structure for teachers (e.g. distributive lead-
ership, staggered schedules, more common planning 
time). As the model grows, it will be critical to provide 
support to help founding school groups think broadly 
about different ways to change schools to use inno-
vation to best meet the needs of their students. One 
strategy for doing so may be to build a bridge between 
innovation school planning groups and charters, who 
enjoy these flexibilities and who, in most instances, 
had the luxury of beginning their school from a blank 
page. Such collaboration may help to spark innova-
tive ideas and an exchange of best practice between 
autonomous schools.
In addition, the state should think about strategies to 
partner with districts to recruit external partners for 
innovation schools. Massachusetts is home to world 
class cultural institutions and nonprofit organizations. 
The innovation school model holds the potential to 
open school districts and schools to partnerships that 
may not previously have existed. Intentional brokering 
of such partnerships may be needed to connect poten-
tial partners. 
2. Urge turnaround schools to consider innovation 
school status as a long term strategy for sustaining 
the turnaround
Another strategy for increasing the number of inno-
vation schools and connecting them to autonomous 
schools could be to urge existing Level 4 schools to 
consider converting to innovation schools when they 
exit Level 4 status (presumably into Level 3). The 
autonomies provided through the innovation school 
model could be a way to preserve the gains made as 
part of the school turnaround, and could sustain the 
autonomies and flexibilities that have contributed to 
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Innovation Schools in Massachusetts
School District Grade Level Model 
School 
Enrollment
District 
Enrollment
% of 
District 
Enrollment Current Status
Valley Virtual Global 
Academy
Belchertown, 
Ware, Granby, 
Easthampton
Grades 7–12 new school 500 1,446 35.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Valley East Academy
Belchertown, 
Ware, Granby, 
Easthampton
Grades 9–12 new school 25 1,446 2.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Roger Clap Innovation 
School
Boston Grades K–5 new school 148 56,037 0.2%
Approved - 
Operating
Accelerated Learning 
Academy
Boston Grades 9–12 new school  56,037
Initial 
Prospectus 
Boston Arts 
Innovation School
Boston Grades 9–12
conversion 
school
415 56,037 1.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Charlestown High/
Bird Street/Diploma 
Plus
Boston Grades 9–12
conversion 
schol
230 56,037 0.4%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Haynes and 
Higginson-Lewis 
Schools
Boston Grades PreK–8
conversion 
school
 56,037
Initial 
Prospectus 
Margartia Muniz 
Academy
Boston Grades 9–12 new school 400 56,037 1.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
University High 
Innovation School
Boston Grades 10–12 new school  56,037
Initial 
Prospectus 
Dudley Street 
Neighborhood School
Boston Grades K–5 new school 280 56,037 0.5%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Marguerite E. Small 
School
Dennis - 
Yartmouth
Grades 4–5
conversion 
school
317 3,199 1.0% Approved
Lawrence School Falmouth Grades 7–8
conversion 
school
556 3,710 15.0% Approved
Wilson International 
School
Framingham Grades K–5
conversion 
school
530 8,182 6.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Discovery School at 
Four Corners
Greenfield Grades K–3
conversion 
school
162 1,790 10.0% Approved
Massachusetts 
Virtual Academy at 
Greenfield
Greenfield Grades 9–12 new school 217 1,790 12.0%
Approved - 
Operating
Hadley Virtual 
Academy of 
Massachusetts
Hadley Grades 3–12 new school 500 710 70.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Monson New Century 
High School
Monson Grades 9–12
conversion 
school
365 1,383 26.0% Approved
New Bedford 
Leadership Academy
New Bedford Grades 9–12 new school 500 12,538 4.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Baccalaureate School 
of North Middlesex
North 
Middlesex
Grades 11–12
conversion 
school, school 
within a school
 3,971 Approved
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School District Grade Level Model 
School 
Enrollment
District 
Enrollment
% of 
District 
Enrollment Current Status
Quaboag Innovation 
STEM Early College
Quaboag Grades 11–12
conversion 
school, school 
within a school
30 1,446 2.0% Approved
Quaboag Innovation 
Middle School
Quaboag Grades 7– 8
conversion 
school
 1,446 Approved
Pathways Early 
College High School
Ralph C 
Mahar 
Regional 
Grades 11–12 new school 40 821 5.0%
Approved - 
Operating
Paul Revere 
Innovation School
Revere Grades K– 5
conversion 
school
389 6,229 6.0%
Approved - 
Operating
Carlton School 
Continuous Progress 
Innovation School
Salem Grades K–5 
conversion 
school
260 4,565 6.0%
Initial 
Prospectus 
Springfield 
Renaissance 
Innovation School
Springfield Grades 6–12
conversion 
school
651 25,213 3.0% Approved
21st Century Skills 
Academy
West 
Springfield
Grades 9–12 new school 200 3,932 5.0% Approved
The Chandler Magnet 
School
Worcester Grades preK–6 
conversion 
school
460 24,192 2.0% Approved
Goddard Scholars 
Academy at Sullivan 
Middle School
Worcester Grades 6–8
conversion 
school
48 24,192 0.1% Approved
Goddard School 
of Science and 
Technology
Worcester Grades preK–6
conversion 
school
586 24,192 2.0% Approved
University Park 
Campus School
Worcester Grades 7–12
conversion 
school
241 24,192 1.0% Approved
Woodland Academy Worcester Grades preK–6 
conversion 
school
492 24,192 2.0% Approved
Innovation Schools in Massachusetts, continued
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1 In order to be eligible for a waiver from the federal government’s NCLB provisions, the state must identify additional Level 
4 schools.
2 http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2012459
3 http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/statecomparisons/
4 These averages are derived from the scaled scores of subgroups of students on the 2011 NAEP assessments in Grades 4 and 8 
Reading and Math. http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/statecomparisons/
5 http://apreport.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/downloads/pdfs/AP%20RTN%202011_StateReport_MA.pdf
6 Union representatives were the least represented in interviews. Additional focus groups and interviews likely are warranted 
to fully capture the perspective of local and state level union officials.
7 One of the turnaround schools has closed, so the original 35 is now 34.
8 http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/603cmr2.html?section=05
9 This total includes the lowest 20% performing schools in Massachusetts, including the Level 4 schools.
10 Boston closed one of its turnaround schools so while 35 were identified, there are currently only 34 Level 4 schools 
operating.
11 The Boston Indicators Project, a partnership between the Boston Foundation, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council and 
the City of Boston, aims to democratize access to information, foster informed public discourse, track progress on shared 
civic goals, and report on change in 10 sectors, including education. More information about the Boston Indicators Project is 
available at: [http://www.bostonindicators.org/Indicators2008/].
12 Performance gains are reported based on the change from 2010 to 2011 and are not tied to individual Annual Goals for 
Turnarounds. This is because this measure was estimated to be the most easily understood, especially in comparison to other 
schools. Each Level 4 school will have its own set of goals that it is also working toward.
13 The participating districts were: Boston, Springfield, Worcester, Lowell, Lawrence, Fall River, New Bedford, Holyoke, and 
Lynn. 
14 Teachers who chose retirement or took a leave of absence are not included in this statement.
15 Note: this is not meant to be a comprehensive list of all of the partners.
16 Gateway Cities are a group of 24 former industrial Massachusetts mill cities, including Chelsea, Lawrence, Fall River, 
Holyoke, Lowell, Lynn, New Bedford, Springfield, Worcester, and others.
17 The replicating charters include: Community Day School in Lawrence, Edward Brooke Charter School, Roxbury Prep, Excel, 
Match School, and KIPP.
18 http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/
19 Defined as students eligible for Free or Reduced Lunch.
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20 Low income students were used because all public schools in Boston enroll large numbers of low income students and 
therefore offered the most valid comparison group. 
21 This does not mean there were 11,000 students applying to charters since students can participate in more than one lottery. 
The number of student participants is not known, though even if it is half that it is still greater than the 4,5004500 seats that 
were chartered. 
22 http://www.doe.mass.edu/charter/app/full.pdf
23 http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/news.aspx?id=6042
24 Enrollment data is for SY10-11, during which time 2 of the 13 schools were operational; the other 11 became Innovation 
Schools at the start of SY11-12.
25 In places where innovation schools were new, or are programs within schools, enrollment data was not available. 
innovation schools included in this analysis are located in Boston, Dennis-Yarmouth, Falmouth, Greenfield, Monson, Ralph 
C. Mahar Regional, Revere, Springfield, and Worcester. Schools not included are: Quaboag Innovation Early College (school-
within-a-school, grades 11–12); Quaboag Innovation Middle School (school-within-a-school, grades 7–8); Baccalaureate 
School of North Middlesex (school-within-a-school, grades 11–12); 21st Century Skills Academy in West Springfield (school-
within-a-school, grades 9–12); and Goddard Scholars Academy at Sullivan Middle School in Worcester (school-within-a-
school, grades 6–8).


